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Revisiting Lewinian Psychology 
Xiao, Coppin & Bavel have provided a valuable service by reminding us that the sub-
disciplines of psychology are not to be defined by reference to the specific (and different) 
phenomena which they address, but by the different levels of analysis at which they address 
the same phenomena. Social psychology, then, is not limited to looking at behaviour when 
we are in the company of others but addresses the ways in which social processes shape what 
we think, feel and do wherever we are and whoever we may be with. The important point 
about such an approach is that, rather than dividing us into different bunkers addressing 
different things, it brings us together to ask how the different levels of analysis can be 
integrated to provide an adequate explanation of the phenomena that interest us all. How can 
the social, the perceptual and the neural be brought together? What are the processes through 
which the social world shapes how we see and process and respond to that world? These are 
big issues, relevant not only to social psychologists and perceptual psychologists but to all in 
psychology. Thus, to put them on the agenda and provoke debate, is an important 
accomplishment. So whatever comments we might have about the detail of Xiao et al’s 
argument, and whatever conceptual differences we might have with their approach, we do not 
want to diminish the significance of this target paper. We are delighted that this conversation 
is happening and delighted to join it. 
 Viewed from this perspective, Xiao et al.’s paper can be seen as accomplishing a 
reinvigoration of Kurt Lewin's classic conceptualisation of social psychology as addressing 
how the psychological field is socially structured (e.g. Lewin, 1939). Xiao et al.’s second 
accomplishment is to recognise that the social identity tradition in social psychology - and 
more specifically, self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 
1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994) - addresses this question directly. This point 
is little understood, in part due to the way in which this tradition developed. Hence it is worth 
spending a little time on spelling it out. 
The concept of self in the social identity approach 
The concept of social identification originally developed in the context of addressing the 
specific question of the conditions under which people develop antagonisms towards 
members of other groups. Tajfel and his colleagues intended to start off with the 'minimal 
conditions' of group division (mere knowledge of the group membership of two others, one a 
member of one’s own group and one a member of another group), and layer on further 
conditions until they found evidence of discriminatory behaviours. To Tajfel’s surprise, even 
these minimal conditions led to discrimination (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971) and 
he was left in a quandry as to why. It was four years before Tajfel, with John Turner, 
developed an explanation in the form of social identity theory (Turner, 1975; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). As the name suggests, the core concept here is that of social identity itself. 
 Social identity is a very simple but a radical concept. First, it introduces the notion of 
the multiple self. That is, in contrast to the traditional notion that people have a single unified 
sense of self which marks them out as a unique sovereign individual (or, if they don't, they 
will suffer for it), it is proposed that the self is a complex system operating at different levels 
of abstraction. Just as we have a sense of what marks us out as individuals compared to other 
individuals (personal identity: 'I' vs. 'you'), we also have a sense of what marks us out as 
members of a particular group compared to other groups (social identity: 'we' vs. 'they'). 
Moreover, we belong to many groups and so have many different social identities (e.g., as an 
American, as a physicist, as a woman, as a Muslim etc.). Furthermore, we can potentially 
define ourselves in terms of yet broader levels of abstraction: as human, as a living creature 
and so on. The point then is that we have many different selves which are salient at different 
times and which affect our psychological functioning in different ways. Notably, social 
identity theory proposes that the shift from inter-individual to intergroup behaviour is 
underpinned by the shift from personal to social identity. 
 Second, the concept of social identity introduces the notion of the variable self: Who 
we are, how we see ourselves, how we define our relations to others (indeed whether they are 
construed as ‘other’ or as part of the extended 'we' self) is different in different settings. Self-
categorisation theory seeks to explain how this variation in the salience of different identities 
is determined as a function of context. So too it seeks to explain how the salience of different 
identities impacts upon psychological functioning. In this latter regard, it has tended to 
concentrate on two issues. The one is the way that, to the extent that a given social identity is 
salient, people tend to self-stereotype in terms of the way the relevant group is defined 
(Haslam & Turner, 1992, 1995; Turner et al., 1987). To build on the classic 'they saw a game' 
study with which Xiao and colleagues introduce their argument, it may well be that, on the 
terraces, watching a game of football, we may bay at the referee if he or she gives a foul to 
the other team or else fails to give a foul to our own. For the definition of a football fan is to 
be loyal and passionate. But when we talk about the same game in our lectures then we focus 
on the evidence not because sanity has suddenly returned, but because, in terms of an 
academic identity, the values of objectivity and dispassionate evaluation of the facts are now 
foremost. 
 The other focus of self-categorisation theory is on how people function together. This, 
in many ways, is the core aspect of group behaviour. It is not just that we have stereotypes, it 
is that we have consensual stereotypes. To the extent that people also have consensus in terms 
of self-stereotyping - they can agree on their norms and values and also on how to act on 
these in the world - then they are able to act together, to combine their efforts, to accumulate 
social power and thereby become better able to implement these norms and values.  
 That is why groups are so important to the human condition (not simply that they 
satisfy a need for belonging): they allow us to transform the world we live in materially as 
well as symbolically. It is a point we often forget, attributing to specific individuals - 
particularly individuals to whom we attribute the magical qualities of leadership - the 
achievements of groups of followers. But to invoke Berthold Brecht's 'Questions from a 
worker who reads': "Who built Thebes of the 7 gates? In the books you will read the names 
of kings. Did the kings haul up the lumps of rock? And Babylon, many times 
demolished, who raised it up so many times? In what houses of gold glittering Lima did its 
builders live? Where, the evening that the Great Wall of China was finished, did the masons 
go?".  
 The contribution of self-categorisation theory is to show how the formation of 
consensus and the possibility of co-action depends upon a shared sense of social identity: 
because group members expect to agree they shape conversations to produce agreement 
(Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Reynolds, 1998). The ability of leaders to motivate and 
direct the coordinated actions of followers depends upon their management of that social 
identity (Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2011). 
 In sum, then, self-categorisation theory is not primarily about specific group 
phenomena such as stereotyping, category salience, polarization, social influence (even 
though it addresses them). Nor indeed is it simply about group phenomena in general (indeed 
many of the principles of self-categorization can be applied at any level of identity, including 
the individual 'I' vs. 'you' level of personal identity - see for instance McGarty, Mavor & 
Skorich, 2015; Reynolds et al., 2010; Skorich & Mavor, 2013). More fundamentally it 
develops the position that the way in which the social world impacts the psychological field 
of the actor is through processes of the variable self (see Reicher, Haslam, Spears & 
Reynolds, 2012).  
Exploring the dynamics of the variable self 
Our argument, then, is that the evidence amassed by Xiao and colleagues speaks specifically 
to the primary ambition of self-categorisation theory. It is certainly reasonable to note that 
self-categorisation theorists have not exhaustively or rigorously addressed the ways in which 
self-dynamics moderate the operation of core perceptual processes (in the broad sense of the 
term to include all sensory modalities). But at the same time, the basic logic of the theory 
does suggest various ways by which that may occur, and some of these have been addressed 
conceptually and empirically. 
 To illustrate this point, it helps to start by appreciating that the notions of the multiple 
self and of the variable self, apply to (and hence problematise) all self-related terms (which 
permeate psychology). This point is well appreciated in some cases. Take the term 'self-
esteem' for instance. Here we know we must distinguish between individual self-esteem 
(pertaining to one as an individual) and collective self-esteem (pertaing to that which the 
same person may derive from membership of a given social group). That is, we know that to 
ask 'what is someone's self-esteem' makes no sense at all without specifying which of these 
selves one is referring to (cf. Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). This is because one’s sense of 
esteem varies as a function of which self is salient. Yet, there are less obvious and perhaps 
more significant examples. Let us consider two such terms, self-relevance and self-interest. 
Self relevance: Imagine that a Palestinian peasant loses their land in some village you had 
never heard of on the West Bank. Would you be bothered? Would an article about the event 
catch your attention and cause you to pause and read? Perhaps, perhaps not. But if you were 
to define yourself as a Muslim in a world where Muslim's are abused and ignored the answer 
would most definitely be yes. The event would be happening to 'one of us' and would 
exemplify 'our' shared plight. It would be highly self-relevant.  
 Or again, imagine that a small island at the other end of the world which, at best, you 
had only vaguely heard of, were occupied by soldiers. Again, would you be bothered? But if 
your identity as British were made salient and if the islanders were construed as Britons, and 
if, moreover the invasion seemed to exemplify the act of a bully and invoke British norms of 
standing up to the bully, then you might be outraged and even support sending a naval task 
force over 10,000 miles to reverse the situation. 
 The point is that whether something attracts our attention - whether it is self-relevant 
or not - depends upon how our self and the event are defined and hence on whether there is a 
connection between the two. What is more, what grabs our attention, how we construe the 
meaning of the event and how we respond to it will likewise depend on the selves at play. For 
instance, when the invaded islands are the Falklands, British observers are likely to notice the 
national qualities of the islanders and the dictatorial decision of the Argentinian junta, rather 
than the widespread popular Argentinian feelings about their sovereignty over the islands. 
 This suggests that there may be processes operating at multiple levels relating to self-
relevance and affecting attentional, encoding and interpretative processes. At the most basic 
level, it may be that we don't encode the other when they are defined as other to the self. Thus, 
for instance McClung, Jentzsch and Reicher (2013) used a low level cognitive task (the joint 
Simon task) in which representation of the other interferes with performance, and found no 
such interference when the other was construed as outgroup but standard levels of 
interference when they were construed as ingroup. At a less basic level, we may well notice 
and encode the plight of the other but decide that it is not worth the effort of intervening. For 
example, Manchester United football fans who have either their narrow club or their broad 
football fan identity made salient and who witness someone falling over, offer different levels 
of help according to whether the person falling wears  a Manchester United, a Liverpool (a 
rival club) or plain red t-shirt (Levine, Prosser, Evans & Reicher, 2005). When a narrow club 
identity is salient, participants help the ingroup member: the Manchester United shirt wearer. 
However, when a broader football fan identity is salient, the Manchester United and 
Liverpool shirt wearers receive equal levels of help (and more than the plain shirt wearer). In 
similar vein, Wakefield et al., (2011) show that when a given identity (in this case 
Scottishness) is defined in more versus less inclusive terms, this is consequential for who is 
listened to and who is helped.   
 Moving on from whether we take account of events to how we take account of them, a 
number of pointers emerge from a programme of research we conducted into what is often 
called the largest collective event on earth – the Magh Mela in Allahabad, Northern India. 
This is a Hindu festival, at the confluence of the sacred Ganges and Yamuna rivers, which 
takes place every year but on a 12 year cycle. An ordinary year draws millions of pilgrims. 
The 6th year draws many more and estimates of the 12th year (or Kumbh Mela) go as high as 
100 million. What piqued our interest is that by all the insights of conventional research 
participation in the Mela should be a highly aversive experience. It is gruelingly cold 
(especially the pre-dawn bathing in the Ganges which is integral to the ritual); it is intensely 
crowded; it is incessantly noisy (with endless loudspeakers blaring discordant chants and 
music night and day) and there are various health risks associated with crowding and the 
potential for infection transmission. And yet, for all this, people describe the event as blissful 
or even serene (Hopkins et al., 2015). How can this be? 
 The answer lies in the way that the sensory experiences have relevance (and hence 
gain meaning) in relation to the social identities of Hindu pilgrims. By overcoming the cold 
in performing their devotions, these people (often old and frail) establish their authenticity as 
believers and gain favour for themselves and their descendants in the long cycle of death and 
rebirth (Pandey, Stevenson, Shankar, Hopkins & Reicher, 2014). The size and density of the 
crowd affirms the importance of the group and the strength of their Hindu beliefs in society 
(Hopkins et al., 2015; Khan et al., 2016). The noise of the crowd, at least when it derives 
from religious songs, chants and dramas, is experienced as a further affirmation of shared 
religious devotion and hence as non-intrusive (Shankar, Stephenson, Pandey, Tewari, 
Hopkins & Reicher, 2013). Indeed we even have evidence that noises attributed to the Mela, 
and hence seen as identity relevant, are encoded more richly and remembered better than 
identical noises attributed to non-identity relevant sources (Srinivasan, et al., 2013; 
Srinivasan, Tewari, Makwana, & Hopkins, 2015). Finally, as concerns the issue of proximity 
and the experience of disgust, we have evidence from elsewhere that bodily excreta (sweat in 
this case) are experienced as less disgusting when they emanate from an ingroup source 
(Reicher, Templeton, Neville, Ferrari & Drury, 2016) 
 All in all, and across a series of modalities, we see that the identity relevance of 
stimuli – that is, precisely what they mean in relation to the self and whether they affirm or 
undermine the self, is critical to the way that they are encoded, evaluated and approached (or 
else avoided). Indeed, we even have evidence from very different settings (the Kosovan war) 
that the most extreme events (being injured in war, or losing a loved one) can acquire a 
positive dimension if the way this happens affirms one’s identity as a true child of the nation 
(Kellezi, Reicher & Cassidy, 2009). 
 None of this should come as a surprise. We already know that self-relevance impacts 
neural activation (Schmitz, Kawahara-Baccus & Johnson, 2004). We know that self-
relevance affects a variety of cognitive processes from visual search (Chiao, Heck, Nakayama 
& Ambady, 2006) to memory (Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald & Macrae, 2008) to appraisal 
(Scmitz & Johnson, 2007). Once one factors in the fact that the self is variable, tied to our 
different group memberships which become salient as a function of the nature of social 
context, then we begin to have a powerful means of understanding how social context can 
come to structure the ways by which we come to understand the reality that confronts us. 
Self interest: All these points gain even more significance when we come to the matter of 
self-interest. In many ways this is one of the most foundational concepts in the social sciences. 
After all, rational actor theories start from the premise that human beings act to maximise 
their self-interest. But on the whole it is presupposed, first, that the self is an individual self - 
thus a good is only of any value if it accrues to me personally - and second that value is to be 
defined in material terms which, in turn, can be reduced to monetary value (Hopkins & 
Kahani-Hopkins, 2004). So rationality then is to be determined by people maximising their 
individual monetary gains. If they do anything else they are irrational, biased, emotional and 
the like. Indeed such a view gives a general picture of human beings as incapable of sound 
judgment (and therefore probably needing their betters to make judgments for them).  
 However, once one recognises the variability of the self, such that (a) when a good 
counts as a good to the self, and (b) what counts as a good are both open to question, much of 
that which is intractable to explanation in terms of rational choice theory (and hence gets 
defined as irrational) immediately becomes intelligible. Take for instance the issue of 
altruism. Is it a matter of some hidden benefit to the self (for instance a gain in reputation 
which one will be able to trade for goods)? Is it a matter of abnegation of the self (such that 
we no longer think about what is in our interests)? A third possibility, introduced by the 
concept of social identity, is that it is an extension of the self. Thus, if one defines oneself in 
terms of a group membership then the good of the group becomes the grounds of self-interest. 
When, during the Romanian revolution of 1989, protestors in the town of Timisoara opened 
their shirts to the notorious Securitate troops and declared 'Shoot - there is no point in being 
alive if Romania is not free’, were they being irrational or were they asserting that their 
individual survival counted for nothing if it impeded the good of the group in terms of which 
they were defined?  
More generally, an emergent body of identity economists recognise that all economic 
decisions depend upon the content of our identities and hence what we value (Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2011). That is, identities define the terms on the basis of which we calculate which 
of the options before us best meet our interests. From this perspective it becomes self-evident 
that we may - depending on whether we define ourselves as a man, a worker, a father, a Jew, 
a liberal - differentially value material wealth, social status, physical domination, kindness, 
generosity, the happiness of others.  
 Given space limitations a handful of illustrations must suffice. Levine and Reicher 
(1996) report a study involving female physical education (PE) students who were presented 
with various illness and injury scenarios involving either facial disfigurement (e.g. scarring) 
or else physical frailty (e.g. brittle bones). When gender identity was made salient and 
appearance was a key value then the disfigurement scenarios which compromise that identity 
were seen as more serious. When PE identity was made salient and physical prowess was a 
key value then the physical frailty scenarios which compromise that identity were seen as 
more serious. In a similar fashion, it might be that in the context of pilgrimage, the social 
identity-related concerns of pilgrims are such as to lessen the value placed on health and 
well-being (Hopkins & Reicher, 2016 a b). To the outsider this might appear irrational. 
However, if one takes proper account of the situationally-relevant values and identity 
concerns, meaningful health interventions can be designed. In another set of studies, 
Sonnenberg (2004) showed that changing the definition of identity - this time, of the same 
identity - can even affect the extent to which we value money (a foundational problem for 
those seeking to establish money as a universal measure of psychological as well as economic 
value). Thus, when psychology students were asked to compare themselves to divinity 
students (against whom they see themselves as more materialistic) they valued money more, 
yet when the comparison was with economics students (next to whom they see themselves as 
less materialistic) they valued money less. More recently, Sonnenberg has begun to explore 
the real world implications of such differences. Thus, the recent emphasis on students as 
consumers, with its focus on education as an economic transaction (students pay fees to get 
higher earning potential in return) has led to students becoming less interested in educational 
priorities such as actual learning (Sonnenberg, in press). 
 In all these cases, the judgments and decisions made by actors may depart from what 
observers consider to make sense. But this is because there is a difference of perspective and 
identity between the two, and hence in definitions of what constitutes a good to the self. It 
does not result from differences in the good sense between the observed and the observer. 
One highly topical example underscores this key point. Katherine Cramer (2016) provides a 
detailed ethnographic study of rural consciousness in the state of Wisconsin and how it 
relates to the rise of Scott Walker (which may also now apply to the rise of Donald Trump). 
One of the questions she asks is why small town dwellers are so antagonistic to higher taxes 
and to state employees when they would be precisely the people to benefit from a big 
redistributive state. Just like the white working class vote for Republicans, isn't this a perfect 
example of not acting in ones interests, "of ignorance or, perhaps, a lack of sophistication" (p. 
144)?. In her own voice, Cramer continues: "But there is another way to read these (views). 
These understandings, whether or not one agrees with them, have roots and reasons behind 
them" (ibid.). 
 Cramer then shows how her respondents view and make sense of government 
spending through the lens of a rural/urban divide, and how, from the perspective of a rural 
identity, their positions do articulate with their perceived interests. Thus, people believed that 
Government is run by urbanites who neither understand nor care about rural areas. While 
they may want more government spending on schools and road-building, they felt (a) so 
hard-pressed already that they could not afford higher taxes; (b) that government imposed 
regulations did not respect the rural way of life; and (c) money would be spent on urban 
concerns with little going to the countryside. All in all "why support education spending 
when you believe that the money collected will not be used to benefit your own district... no-
one considers the possibility that any of these policies - school aid policy, recreational land 
designations - were created with rural interests in mind. Instead the lens is of unfairness to 
rural places and rural people" (p. 164). 
 To translate all this into the terms we have just been discussing, Cramer's 
interviewees consider that increased government spending would not accrue to them as rural 
folk and would not take a form which corresponded to what they value as rural folk. Such 
spending would not be in their rural self-interest and so they are not being irrational in 
rejecting it. 
Against irrationalism 
The reason we repeatedly address the issue of rationality in this way is that we see it as of 
both analytic and of normative importance. It is also central to the meta-theory of self-
categorization research. Hence, in their repeated reference to bias (as if group level processes 
distort our understanding of social reality) this is one place where we feel that Xiao et al. 
depart both from the social identity tradition and from our own approach.  
 For Turner and his colleagues, the way we categorise the world reflects the situated 
structure of social reality (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991). 
That is, group level perception is a fair and veridical representation of reality given the 
positioning of the subject. People see people in group terms not as a means of simplifying 
(and thereby distorting) an overly complex array of information but because, sometimes, 
people are organised in group terms in the real world. The cover of Stereotyping and Social 
Reality (the Oakes et al., 1994 book) has a picture of police charging protestors in a riot. The 
point is that it would not make sense for these protestors to process how the individual 
officers differ from each other. What matters in this situation is what these others have in 
common and how they act in common in relation to the protestors. 
 Oakes et al. (1994) argue that there is a highly normative dimension to the notion of 
group perception as intellectually inferior. It translates an ideological preference for the 
individual over the collective (because collectives provide the powerless with the power to 
challenge the status quo) into a cognitive hierarchy. It sends out the message 'stay separate, 
groups are bad for you' (see also Brown, 1988). It is a means of warning against combining in 
order to challenge the status quo.  
 We wish to take the argument a step further. There is a tendency to describe human 
behaviour in general in terms of ignoring, distorting or misusing the information available to 
us. It is not just in groups that heuristics, biases and emotions prevail. And, as we suggested 
above, it is easy to discern elitist normative implications: if people cannot process 
information accurately, they need others to process it for them. This is an attitude we have 
repeatedly encountered working with government - who, for instance, are reluctant to 
communicate with the population in the case of emergencies for fear that people will simply 
panic (even though there is a body of literature to show that it is the self-organisation of 
ordinary people rather than the intervention of state services that is most effective in such 
emergencies - see Drury, Cocking & Reicher, 2009; Drury, Novelli & Stott, 2013). 
 Our approach is that humans are meaning-making creatures. We don't reduce 
information. We evaluate information in order to create sense out of events - this includes 
what is happening, what it means for us and hence whether/how we should respond to it. Our 
psychological apparatus is therefore fundamentally creative rather than destructive, and a 
sense of self is a fundamental aspect of this creative sense-making apparatus. As Cramer 
shows so eloquently, collective identities are particularly effective in enabling our 
understanding of a complex and opaque social world and of translating mere data into a 
functional world view. 
From perception to action 
Up until now our argument has been broadly consonant with that of Xiao et al. - even if we 
differ on the issue of bias and rationality. We welcome their broad approach, we welcome 
their broad understanding of the social identity tradition. What we have sought to do is to 
show how their arguments sit with that tradition, but also how a self-categorisation approach 
provides the conceptual framework for understanding the various levels and the various ways 
in which groups and social identities shape perception and action. To finish, though, we wish 
to sound a note of caution. That is, while it is certainly critical to examine the articulation of 
social identity processes with processes of perception, we should not reduce the 
consequences and antecedents of social identification to matters of perception. Nor indeed 
should we center social identity on perception. Rather we see social identity processes as 
being tied to action - more specifically to the organisation of social practice - and we see 
perception (and also emotion) as an element in that relationship. There are three principal 
reasons for cautioning against a reductively perceptual account. 
 First, there is a danger of assuming that group membership is entirely a matter of 
choice and to ignore the reality of constraint. Being a group member is not just a matter of 
how I see myself but also a matter of how others see me and who they allow me to be. We 
may well self-define as a member of a particular social group, say Scots, and see ourselves as 
fulfilling important criteria of Scottishness (living in Scotland, being committed to the 
country). But being born in England and with our obvious English accents, will others accept 
us as such, include us as such, accord us the rights and privileges associated with membership 
(see Hopkins, Reicher & van Rijswijk, 2015). That cannot be assumed. More consequentially, 
some of our ancestors, Jews living in Poland, may well have seen themselves as Polish. But 
were they allowed to be so? Edward Reicher tells a story of when, during the Warsaw 
Uprising of 1944, he came out of hiding and onto the barricades with a young man. This 
young man, feeling free at last, cried out to a soldier that Jews and Catholics could at last 
fight together as Poles. The soldier disagreed. He turned and shot the young man (E. Reicher, 
2013). 
 But it is not just that we can't always be who we see ourselves as being. Very often 
people are forced to be members of groups they don't necessarily see themselves as being. Do 
people originally choose to be black, say? Or is it rather that others force them and treat them 
as such to the extent that they ultimately have little option but to accept the category - even if 
only as a means of contesting a world structured on racial lines (Carmichael & Hamilton, 
1967). In other words, in a world where others might attack you or exclude you or mistreat 
you for being black, can you afford not to see yourself (and the other) in racial terms? 
 Macek (2009) provides a masterly analysis of how such processes operated in 
Sarajevo under seige during the Bosnian conflict. Perhaps surprisingly, she shows how, 
initially, the forces defending the city were entirely ethnically integrated. But after Serbs had 
killed Muslims elsewhere in the country, Muslim defenders began to view those they 
identified as Serb as potentially untrustworthy. This led those so identified to feel threatened 
and some defected across the front lines to join the Serbian attackers. This, in turn, solidified 
the sense of Serbs as untrustworthy. And so, through these intergroup dynamics of 
misrecognition and mistreatment, categories that everyone rejected at first in time became 
inescapable. 
 The second reason for moving beyond a perceptual account is that it is very static and 
one- sided. If categories simply reflect the world as it is, how come collectivities are the main 
basis of social change? Yet, Tajfel and Turner (1979) actually present their analysis of social 
identity and group processes primary as a model of change. It is quite clear that, even if 
categories relate to social reality, they are not rigidly tied to the world as it is. This is quite 
obvious if we think of what are probably the most prevalent set of categories in the 
contemporary world: national categories. On the one hand we think in terms of nationhood 
because everyday reality is organised along national terms in even the most banal of ways. 
When we think of 'the economy doing well/badly' or 'the weather being good/bad' we are 
generally thinking of the national economy and the national weather. We don't need hot 
displays of passion for the nation to be structured into our ways of thinking (see Billig, 1995). 
But at the same time, nationalists use social categories in order to create nation states and 
national realities where they do not previously exist. Here the category is about creating 
reality rather than reflecting reality. It is about creating a constituency of people acting 
together and hence (as we have previously argued) having the power to bring new forms of 
social organisation into being (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Another way of putting this is to 
say that social identity processes are oriented to the future not just the present. And, given 
that the future is not determined, there is space for categories to be contested and argued over. 
Indeed they are bound to be argued over insofar as they are the basis for creating and 
influencing new constituencies and hence for wielding social power (Reicher & Hopkins, 
2001). Social identification, then, is not just about perception of what is, it is about 
mobilisation of people to create what might be.  
 The third and final reason for not reducing social identities to perception is that this 
simply isn't the way people gain their understandings. It seems to imply that we are passive 
beings in a silent world who gaze upon the scenes before us and, individually and 
deliberatively, read off who we are. But on all the issues that concern us and which are at the 
core of social psychological studies - what we think of others such as migrants or Mexicans 
or the European Union; our attitudes towards issues such as the economy and climate change; 
whether we should help the poor or afflicted or displaced - the reality is that every time we 
turn on the radio or the television or access a website or read a newspaper, we are assailed by 
multiple voices positioning us in different ways and telling us what to think. Inevitably, this 
returns us to the issue of group members’ ‘interest’ discussed earlier. Argument over the 
relevance and meaning of any social category, and who and what best represents that 
category, implies argument over group members’ interests and futures (Hopkins & Kahani-
Hopkins, 2004). 
 In a complex social world, where the evidence is uncertain and we often lack the 
expertise to evaluate arguments, we have to make decisions about which voice to attend to 
and who to trust. And that depends upon the way we position ourselves in relation to the 
various speakers. Understanding is therefore bound up with issues of leadership (Haslam et 
al., 2011) and there is a double sense in which leaders are involved in mobilising identity. 
First, they appeal to us on the basis of shared identities ('I am the voice of ordinary people 
like you'); second, they seek to sway us by relating events to these identities (oppose this 
policy because it is bad for ordinary people). If we limit ourselves to perception, we sideline 
ourselves from understanding the contemporary events that are making our world (see 
Reicher & Haslam, in press). 
Conclusion 
Let us finish as we started. We welcome the target paper and hope it will generate widespread 
debate that exerts a centripetal force on psychology in an increasingly centrifugal world. That 
is, how do groups and social identities structure our perception (and our psychological field 
more generally), thereby shaping our actions. We have sought to contribute to this debate by 
drawing out the logic of self-categorisation theory and showing how it provides a framework 
for answering these questions. At the same time we have raised two concerns. The first 
relates to the dangers of linking groups and irrationalism (or, more generally, taking an 
irrationalist perspective on human understanding). The other relates to the problem of taking 
perception as the whole story rather than just a part of it. We offer these thoughts in the hope 
of generating yet further debate. To paraphrase Humphrey Bogart's final words in Casablanca, 






Akerlof, G.A., & Kranton, R.E. (2011). Identity Economics: How our identities shape our 
work, wages and well-being. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Billig, M. (1995). Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. 
Brown, R. (1988) Group Processes. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Carmichael, S., & Hamilton, C.V. (1967). Black Power. New York: Vintage Books. 
Chiao, J. Y., Heck, H. E., Nakayama, K., & Ambady, N. (2006). Priming race in biracial  
observers affects visual search for Black and White faces. Psychological Science, 17, 
387-392. 
Cramer, K.J. (2016). The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and The 
Rise of Scott Walker. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Cunningham, S. J., Turk, D. J., Macdonald, L. M., & Macrae, C. N. (2008). Yours or mine?  
Ownership and memory. Consciousness and cognition, 17, 312-318. 
Drury, J., Cocking, C., & Reicher, S.D. (2009). The nature of collective resilience: Survivor  
reactions to the 2005 London bombings. International Journal of Mass Emergencies 
and Disasters, 27, 66-95. 
Drury, J., Novelli, D., & Stott, C. (2013). Psychological disaster myths in the perception and  
management of mass emergencies.  Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 43, 2259-
2270.  
Haslam, S.A., Reicher. S.D. & Platow, M. (2011). The New Psychology of Leadership.  
London: Psychology Press. 
Haslam, S. A., & Turner, J. C. (1992). Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping 2:  
The relationship between frame of reference, self-categorization and accentuation. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 22, 251-277.  
Haslam, S. A., & Turner, J. C. (1995). Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping 3: 
Extremism as a self-categorical basis for polarized judgement. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 25, 341-371. 
Haslam, S. A., Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., McGarty, C., & Reynolds, K. J. (1998). The group 
as a basis for emergent stereotype consensus. European Review of Social Psychology, 
8, 203-239.  
Hopkins, N., & Kahani-Hopkins, V. (2004). Identity construction and political  
activity: Beyond rational actor theory. British Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 
339-356.  
Hopkins, N., & Reicher, S. (2016a). The psychology of health and well-being in mass  
gatherings: A review and a research agenda. Journal of Epidemiology and Global 
Health, 6, 49-57. 
Hopkins, N., & Reicher, S. (2016b). Adding a Psychological Dimension to Mass Gatherings 
Medicine. International Journal of Infectious Diseases. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijid.2015.12.017 
Hopkins, N., Reicher, S.D., & van Rijswijk, W. (2015).Everyday citizenship: Identity claims 
and their reception. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 3, 84-106. 
Hopkins, N., Stevenson, C., Shankar, S., Pandey, K., Khan, S. & Tewari, S. (2015). Being 
together at the Magh Mela: The social psychology of crowds and collectivity. In Gale, 
T. Maddrell, A., & Terry, A. (eds.). Sacred Mobilities (pp. 19-40). Farnham, UK: 
Ashgate.  
Kellezi, B., Reicher, S., & Cassidy, C. (2009). Surviving the Kosovo Conflict: A Study of 
Social Identity, Appraisal of Extreme Events, and Mental Well‐Being. Applied 
Psychology, 58, 59-83. 
Khan, S., Hopkins, N., Reicher, S., Tewari, S., Srinivasan, N. & Stevenson, C. (2016). How 
Collective Participation Impacts Social Identity: A Longitudinal Study From India. 
Political Psychology. DOI: 10.1111/pops.12260. 
Levine, R. M., & Reicher, S. D. (1996). Making sense of symptoms: Self-categorization and 
the meaning of illness and injury. British Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 245-256. 
Levine, M., Prosser, A., Evans, D., & Reicher, S.D. (2005). Identity and emergency  
intervention: How social group membership and inclusiveness of group boundaries 
shape helping behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 443-453. 
Lewin, K. (1939) Field theory and experiment in social psychology: Concepts and methods. 
American Journal of Sociology, 44, 868-896. 
Luhtanen, R., & Crocker, J. (1992). A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of one's 
social identity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 302-318. 
Macek, I. (2009) Sarajevo under Siege: Ethnography in Wartime. Phildelphia, Pa: University 
of Pennsylvania Press 
McLung, J., Jentzsch, I. & Reicher, S.D. (2013) Group membership affects spontaneous 
mental representation: Failure to represent the out-group in a joint action task. PLoS 
ONE, 8 (11): e79178. 
McGarty, C., Mavor, K. I., & Skorich, D. P. (2015). Social categorization. In J. D. Wright 
(Ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral sciences (2nd Ed, vol 
22, pp. 186-191). Oxford, UK: Elsevier. 
Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & Turner, J. C. (1994). Stereotyping and Social Reality. Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell.  
Oakes, P. J., Turner, J. C., & Haslam, S. A. (1991). Perceiving people as group members: The 
role of fit in the salience of social categorizations. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 30, 125-144. 
Pandey, K., Stevenson, C., Shankar, S., Hopkins, N., & Reicher, S. D. (2014). Cold comfort 
at the Magh Mela: Social identity processes and physical hardship. British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 53, 675-690. 
Reicher, E. (2013) Country of Ash: A Jewish Doctor in Poland, 1939-1945. New York: 
Bellevue Literary Press. 
Reicher, S.D., & Haslam, S.A. (in press) Donald Trump and the politics of hope: a social 
identity analysis of the leader's appeal. In M. Fitzduff (Ed.) Why Irrational Politics 
Appeals. Santa Barbara: Praeger.  
Reicher, S. D., Haslam, S. A., Spears, R., & Reynolds, K. J. (2012). A social mind: The 
context of John Turner’s work and its influence. European Review of Social 
Psychology, 23, 344-385. 
Reicher, S.D., & Hopkins, N.P. (2001) Self and Nation. London: Sage 
Reicher, S. D., Templeton, A., Neville, F., Ferrari, L., & Drury, J. (2016). Core disgust is 
attenuated by ingroup relations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
201517027. 
Reynolds, K. J., Turner, J. C., Branscombe, N. R., Mavor, K. I., Bizumic, B., & Subacic, E. 
(2010). Interactionism in personality and social psychology:  An integrated approach 
to understanding the mind and behaviour. European Journal of Personality, 24, 458-
482. 
Schmitz, T. W., & Johnson, S. C. (2007). Relevance to self: a brief review and framework of 
neural systems underlying appraisal. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 31, 
585-596. 
Schmitz, T. W., Kawahara-Baccus, T. N., & Johnson, S. C. (2004). Metacognitive evaluation, 
self-relevance, and the right prefrontal cortex. Neuroimage, 22, 941-947. 
Shankar, S., Stevenson, C., Pandey, K., Tewari, S., Hopkins, N. & Reicher, S. D. (2013). A 
calming cacophony: Social identity can shape the experience of loud noise. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 36, 87-95. 
Skorich, D. P. &  Mavor, K. I. (2013). Cognitive load privileges memory-based over data-
driven processing, not group-level over person-level processing. British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 52, 469-488. 
Sonnenberg, S.J. (2004). Money & Self: Towards a social psychology of money and its usage. 
University of St. Andrews: Unpublished PhD Thesis. 
Sonnenberg, S. J. (in press). Student identity and the marketisation of Higher Education, in 
Mavor, K. I., Platow, M. J. and Bizumic, B (Eds). Self and social identity in 
educational contexts.  London: Routledge. 
Srinivasan, N., Tewari, S., Makwana, M., & Hopkins, N. (2015). Attention mediates the 
effect of context-relevant social meaning on prospective duration judgments. Timing 
& Time Perception, 3, 189-200. 
Srinivasan, N., Hopkins, N., Reicher, S. D., Khan, S. S., Singh, T., & Levine, M. (2013). 
Social meaning of ambiguous sounds influences retrospective duration judgments. 
Psychological science, 24, 1060-1062. 
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and 
intergroup behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 149-178.  
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. 
Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (pp. 33-
47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Turner, J.C. (1975) Social comparison and social identity; some prospects for intergroup 
behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 5, 5-34. 
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). 
Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell. 
Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & McGarty, C. (1994). Self and collective: 
Cognition and social context. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 454-
454.  
Wakefield, J.R.H., Hopkins, N. Cockburn, C. Shek, K.M.,Muirhead, A., Reicher, S. & van 
Rijswijk, W. (2011). Impact of Adopting Ethnic or Civic Conceptions of National 
Belonging for Others’ Treatment. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 
1599-1610.  
